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Abstract
Self-generated cognitions, such as recalling personal memories or empathizing with others, are 
ubiquitous and essential for our lives. Such internal mental processing is ascribed to the Default 
Mode Network, a large network of the human brain, though the underlying neural and cognitive 
mechanisms remain poorly understood. Here, we tested the hypothesis that our mental experience 
is mediated by a combination of activities of multiple cognitive processes. Our study included four 
functional MRI experiments with the same participants and a wide range of cognitive tasks, as 
well as an analytical approach that afforded the identification of cognitive processes during self-
generated cognition. We showed that several cognitive processes functioned simultaneously during 
self-generated mental activity. The processes had specific and localized neural representations, 
suggesting that they support different aspects of internal processing. Overall, we demonstrate that 
internally directed experience may be achieved by pooling over multiple cognitive processes.
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Introduction
Self-generated cognition (also referred to as internally directed cognition or internal 
processing) such as recalling memories, thinking about the future, or just mind wandering, is 
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a key part of our experience. The functional roles and benefits of self-generated thinking 
have not been fully understood1, but given the abundance of this type of thinking in our 
lives2, self-generated thinking is likely to be essential for humans. Accordingly, 
understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms of self-generated cognition is an 
important endeavor. The literature on self-generated cognition3, 4 makes a distinction 
between self-generated processing that is initiated by an external task (e.g., when a 
participant is asked to recall some specific past episode5–8) and a spontaneous, 
unconstrained self-generated processing without a specific task (e.g., mind-wandering9–12). 
In the present study, we explore task-initiated self-generated processing.
It is generally accepted that the Default Mode Network (DMN) is the principal brain locus 
of internal processing and self-generated cognition4, 13–16. The DMN has been implicated 
in various types of processing, such as self-referential processing17–23, mental scene 
construction24–27 and scene imagery28, mental time travel29–31, semantic processing32–
35, constructive episodic memory5, 6 and retrieval of episodic memory36–41, social-related 
processing42–48, affective and emotional processing49 and creativity50, 51. In addition, 
functional heterogeneity within the DMN has been established52–64. A conceptualization of 
these and similar observations has been provided by the multi-component account, 
according to which the DMN operates through multiple interactive components (or cognitive 
processes) working together4. While the authors of this account do not specify this 
explicitly, the two important functional principles that stem from the multi-component 
account are: 1) different cognitive processes work at the same time; and 2) different 
cognitive processes are responsible for specific and distinct types of processing. 
Accordingly, to directly and empirically support the multi-component account, both these 
principles must be shown in action within the same experiment. Previous research on self-
generated cognition using both task-based experiments7, 8, 21, 65–73 and spontaneous (e.g., 
resting scan) experiments35, 74–81 showed that different parts of the DMN and connectivity 
between different DMN nodes are selective to different tasks and types of processing. These 
results have generally supported the multi-component account. Notably, none of the previous 
studies (except for one, see below) showed different processes working at the same time. In 
addition, in many task-based studies, the cognitive processes were not identified specifically 
because this was not the goal of these studies. The only study that satisfied conditions of 
direct support has been the study of Andrews-Hanna and colleagues82, which used a 
combination of resting state hierarchical clustering, future and present self-related decision 
tasks, and behavioral introspective measures. The authors showed that the DMN consists of 
three functionally distinct subsystems that are active at the same time. It is noteworthy that 
specifically identifying cognitive processes has been traditionally challenging because the 
cognitive processes are inherently intertwined during self-generated processing. For 
example, recalling a past episode is likely to entail both episodic memory retrieval and 
mental scene construction processing, but experimentally to tease these two processes apart 
is not straightforward27, 83. Additional examples of non-easily dissociated processes 
include mental time travel and scene construction24, 82, 84, episodic memory retrieval and 
self-referential processing18, 85, and episodic and semantic memory86, 87. In the present 
study we devised the approach to address the aforementioned challenges and limitations. 
This approach permitted us to comprehensively and systematically characterize cognitive 
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processing within the DMN during self-generated processing, and to test the multi-
component proposal directly.
Thirty-six participants took part in four functional MRI (fMRI) experiments (thirty-one of 
these took part in all four experiment). The experiments included: 1) a main self-generated 
experiment that included 15-second blocks of free retrieval of personal episodic memory, 
future and past imagery, and empathizing task; and three experiments that selectively 
manipulated specific cognitive processes: 2) a self-referential experiment with visually 
presented verbs that characterize a person; 3) visually presented images of scenes and 
objects; and 4) visually presented meaningful sentences and non-words (i.e., language-
related processing). We predicted that the execution of the self-generated, free tasks in 
Experiment 1 would be associated with the activity of different cognitive processes. Our 
approach was to use experiments 2–4 to manipulate specific cognitive processes selectively, 
and then to use the activity of each of these experiments to identify corresponding cognitive 
processes during the self-generated processing in Experiment 1. Our goal was to identify 
and delineate three specific cognitive processes (i.e., self-referential, mental scene 
construction, and language-related processing) and to show the functioning of these 
processes at the same time during internal processing, thus supporting the hypothesis that 
mental experience is mediated by different cognitive processes. It should be emphasized that 
the goal of the present study was not to determine differences between individual internal 
tasks; therefore, the comparison of individual tasks was performed only when it served our 
main goal (see above).
Results
Experiment 1: Self-generated cognition
While lying in the scanner, participants were asked to generate mental experiences 
associated with a given picture (Fig. 1A; four tasks of interest: imagine what happened 
before ("past imagery") or after ("future imagery") the depicted scene, recall a personal 
episodic memory related to the depicted scene ("episodic memory"), imagine yourself as the 
person in the picture ("empathizing"). The baseline condition was generation of rhymes for a 
given word. The structure of the trials and visual stimuli were the same for all five 
conditions, including irrelevant image presentation in the baseline condition to preserve 
equivalent visual stimulation (see Methods for more details). The four tasks of interest are 
hereafter referred to as "internal mentation" or "internal" tasks. At the end of each trial, 
participants provided vividness ratings of their internal experience (Fig. 1a; scale ranged 
from 1 [highest vividness] to 4 [lowest vividness]). Vividness ratings were as follows: 
"episodic memory" (mean=1.74, MSE=0.07), "future imagery" (mean=1.74,MSE=0.07), 
"past imagery" (mean=1.92,MSE=0.07), and "empathizing" (mean=1.77,MSE=0.08). 
Conditions varied with regard to level of vividness [one-way repeated measures ANOVA: 
F(3,105)=3.67,p=0.015, partial η2=0.095]. This effect was due to a lower vividness in "past 
imagery" compared to the other three conditions.
To examine the activity associated with each of the four internal mentation tasks, each task 
was contrasted separately with the rhyme-generation baseline condition (four separate 
contrasts; random effects, group-level analysis, primary voxel-wised threshold p < 0.001, 
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p<0.05, cluster size corrected; the primary threshold p-value < 0.001 has previously been 
shown to control well for the false positive rate88, 89). The group-level results are shown in 
Fig. 1b. All four contrasts (i.e., internal tasks) yielded typical DMN activations13, thus 
confirming previous reports that different types of internal mental activity engage the 
DMN65, 90. As the next step, for key nodes of the DMN network, we extracted percent 
signal change time-courses. The ROIs (Fig. 1c and Supplementary Table 1) were 
independently defined91 based on the individual DMN activation maps obtained in the first 
session of our experiment; all the analyses presented below were conducted using the 
remaining sessions (see Methods and Supplementary Methods for more details). The time-
courses for all conditions are shown in Fig. 2. First, in all ROIs, we identified a dissociation 
between the four internal mentation tasks and the baseline rhyme-generation task [average of 
four internal tasks vs. baseline task: t(35)>7.68, p<5×10-9]. It is worth noting that in both 
internal and baseline conditions the participants had their eyes closed. Thus, the robust 
dissociation between two types of conditions underscores that activation of the DMN 
reflects not merely the absence of an external task, but is also dependent on the nature of the 
non-external task (e.g., episodic memory thinking vs. rhymes generation). Second, the shape 
of the internal tasks time-courses differed across DMN regions. In particular, we observed a 
clear, positive, inverted U-shape response in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and 
angular gyrus as well as in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in the "episodic memory" 
condition. In contrast, there was a negative U-shape response in the parahippocampal cortex 
(PHC). Dissociation between DMN regions hints at different roles played by different 
regions in internal processing. It is noteworthy that from the activation maps (Fig. 1b), we 
could not discern whether the response to the task of interest was activation (e.g., PCC and 
angular gyrus) or deactivation (e.g., PHC). Finally, in the PCC and mPFC, there were visibly 
higher responses in "episodic memory" compared to the other conditions. A plausible 
explanation for this effect is that "episodic memory" (i.e., recalling of personal events) 
entailed stronger self-related processing compared to other tasks85. This hypothesis is 
corroborated by the results in this text (see, Supplementary Figure 2a), but in general, the 
dissociation between internal tasks is not the focus of the present paper.
We thus established that the DMN was activated by all of the internal tasks of Experiment 1. 
Now, we proceeded with our main goal – namely, to demonstrate that self-generated 
processing in the DMN operates through several independent processes.
Experiment 2 – Self-referential processing
We used a commonly accepted method to elucidate self-referential processing by contrasting 
the activity resulting from making a judgment about the self versus someone else92–94. In 
our experiment participants made two types of judgments for the same verbs that describe a 
person ("self-referential" condition: whether an action was characteristic of them; "non-self-
referential" condition: whether an action was characteristic of some ideal person (see 
Methods for more details). To validate the effectiveness of our manipulation, after the 
experiment participants rated their subjective experience during the experiment by 
answering "To what extent each one of the tasks was associated with self-related and 
personal thoughts?" (Likert scale: 1[low] − 10[high]). The results confirmed that "self-
referential" condition was associated with more self-related and personal thoughts than 
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"non-self-referential" condition ["self-referential": mean=6.03, SEM=0.517; "non-self-
referential": mean=4.45,SEM=0.489; paired, two-sided t-test: t(30)=5.09,p<0.001,Cohen's 
d=0.95, CI: 0.94–2.21].
First, we conducted a GLM second-level, random-effect analysis contrasting the "self-
referential" versus "non-self-referential" conditions (Fig. 3a). In all figures, the blue contour 
denotes the DMN identified using first session (independent data). In agreement with 
previous reports94, most of the activations were found in the DMN medial frontal, posterior 
cingulate, and left lateral posterior parietal regions. This provides evidence, albeit indirect, 
that during self-generated internal tasks these parts of the DMN are engaged in self-
referential processing.
To obtain more direct evidence, we conducted representational similarity analysis95 between 
Experiments 1 and 2. Compared to spatial activation overlap, representational similarity 
analysis provides stronger evidence because it informs us about the similarity of information 
processing in brain regions96, 97. For each participant and within each ROI (across voxels), 
we correlated between contrast values of internal processing selectivity (Experiment 1; 
contrast: "episodic memory" + "past imagery" + "future imagery" + "empathizing" > 
"rhymes generation") and contrast values of self-referential selectivity (Experiment 2; 
contrast: "self-referential" >"non-self-referential"). The results of this analysis are shown in 
Fig. 3b (for individual data, see Supplementary Figure 1A). Similarity between the two 
experiments was significantly above zero (after multiple comparison Bonferroni correction 
for number of tested regions, N=8, alpha=0.05/8=0.00625) in mPFC 
[t(33)=6.37,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.09, 99.375% confidence interval (CI): 0.22–0.61], PCC 
[t(33)=4.75,p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.81, 99.375% CI: 0.14–0.57] and left angular gyrus 
[t(33)=3.82,p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.65, 99.375% CI: 0.07–0.5]. In the left LTC, the similarity 
was above zero, but did not reach significance after multiple comparison 
[t(33)=2.83,p=0.0078,Cohen's d=0.49, 99.375% CI: -0.004–0.3]. In the remaining regions, 
the similarity did not differ from zero [t<1]. To examine the specificity of the result, we 
conducted two types of analyses. First, we tested regional specificity by comparing the 
similarity between regions. For the mPFC and PCC, the similarity was significantly higher 
(after multiple comparison Bonferroni correction for number of tested regions, N=7, 
alpha=0.05/7=0.0071) than in the right angular gyrus, bilateral LTC, and bilateral PHC 
(p<0.001,Cohen's d > 0.6). For the left angular gyrus, the similarity was significantly higher 
than in the right angular gyrus, right LTC, and bilateral PHC (p<0.001, Cohen's d > 0.71), 
but did not significantly differ from the left LTC after multiple comparison correction 
(p=0.021,Cohen's d>0.42). No significant difference in similarity was observed between the 
mPFC, PCC, and left angular gyrus (p>0.1). Second, we tested processing type specificity 
by comparing the similarity obtained in the present analysis [i.e., similarity between internal 
processing (Experiment 1) and self-referential processing (Experiment 2)] versus the 
similarity of internal processing (Experiment 1) and each of two additional experiments 
presented below (Experiment 3: scene construction and Experiment 4: language-related 
processing; see Supplementary Methods for more details). Compared to internal processing 
vs. scene construction, we found high specificity in mPFC [t(31)=5.5,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1], 
PCC [t(31)=4.96, p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.92, 99.375% CI: 0.35–0.76], and the left angular 
gyrus [t(31)=4.26, p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.75, 99.375% CI: 0.17–0.86]. Compared to internal 
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processing vs. language-related processing, there was high self-referential specificity in the 
mPFC [t(31)=3.89,p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.69, 99.375% CI: 0.11–0.82] and PCC 
[t(31)=2.87,p=0.007,Cohen's d=0.51, 99.375% CI: -0.001–0.6], but not in the left angular 
gyrus [t(31)<1].
In addition to ROI analysis, we conducted a searchlight representational analysis between 
internal processing (Experiment 1) and self-referential selectivity (Experiment 2). The main 
benefit of this approach is that this analysis makes no a priori assumptions regarding ROI 
location, thus permitting the examination of similarity across different parts of the DMN, as 
well as outside the DMN. The unthresholded findings are shown in Fig. 3c (top) and the 
significant clusters in Fig. 3c (bottom; primary voxel-wised threshold p<0.001, p<0.05, 
cluster size corrected). Remarkably, in line with ROI analysis, the only three significant 
clusters were in the mPFC, PCC, and left angular gyrus (Supplementary Table 2). We can 
clearly see that no significant representational similarity was identified (at the statistical 
thresholds used) in LTC, PHC, right angular gyrus DMN regions or any outside-DMN 
regions. Taken together, we conclude that mPFC, PCC and left angular gyrus were the 
primary loci of self-referential processing during internal processing of Experiment 1.
In previous analyses, the four internal tasks were considered as one condition (i.e., "internal 
processing"). As a complementary and more exploratory analysis, we conducted 
representational similarity analysis between individual internal tasks of Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 (for full results, see Supplementary Results, "Representational ROI analysis of 
individual tasks"). In the mPFC and PCC, across four tasks of Experiment 1 the highest 
similarity was observed between the "episodic memory" task and the self-referential 
processing of Experiment 2 (Supplementary Figure 2a). This result corroborates the idea that 
higher BOLD signals associated with "episodic memory" in mPFC and PCC of Experiment 
1 (Fig. 2) was at least partially related to self-referential processing.
In a complementary analysis, we also tested similarities between self-referential and 
language-related processing (Experiment 3), as well as the similarity between self-referential 
and scene-construction processing (Experiment 4). Results of these analyses are presented in 
the Supplementary Results and Supplementary Figs. 3 and 4. We found clusters with a high 
similarity between self-referential and language-related processing in the lateral temporal 
and frontal cortex, but mostly not within the DMN (Supplementary Figure 4).
Experiment 3 – Scene construction
Results of Experiments 1 and 2 reveal an interesting dissociation with regard to the PHC: 
whereas the region exhibited a much higher response to internal tasks compared to baseline 
in Experiment 1 (Figs. 1b and 2), it was not involved in self-referential processing in 
Experiment 2 (Fig. 3). In general, the PHC has primarily been implicated in spatial 
navigation, visual scene processing, and contextual processing98. In addition, it has been 
suggested that the region plays a role in scene construction during internal mentation24–27, 
as well as in imagery28. To test whether the scene construction hypothesis can explain the 
dissociation between Experiments 1 and 2 with regard to PHC, after the study we asked 
participants to rate the extent each of the tasks was associated with having a mental scene in 
their minds (Likert scale: 1[low] − 10[high]). We found that in Experiment 1, the subjective 
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experience of "a scene in the mind" was much stronger during the internal tasks than during 
the rhymes generation task [internal tasks: mean=7.74, SEM=0.33; rhymes generation: 
mean=1.52, SEM=0.21; t(32)=19.33,p<0.001,Cohen's d=3.36, CI: 5.57–6.88]. In contrast, in 
Experiment 2 there was only a slight and insignificant difference in the subjective experience 
of "a scene in the mind" between "self-referential" and "non-self-referential" conditions 
["self-referential": mean=3.16,SEM=0.43; "non-self-referential": mean=2.8,SEM=0.44; 
t(30)<1,Cohen's d=0.17, CI: -039–1.09]. Thus, the role of the PHC during internal 
processing (i.e., Experiment 1) may indeed be related to mental scene construction. To 
investigate this question more directly, we conducted additional fMRI experiment with the 
same participants. Experiment 3 included visual presentation of unfamiliar images of scenes 
and objects99. The key idea was to use the scene-selective activity of Experiment 3 as the 
neural marker to find mental scene construction during self-generated tasks of Experiment 1.
First, we conducted a GLM second-level, random-effect analysis contrasting "scenes" versus 
"objects" conditions (Fig. 4a). This revealed a well-characterized network of scene-selective 
regions in the PHC, retrosplenial cortex and middle occipital gyrus (also referred as 
transverse occipital sulcus)100. Large parts of this network overlapped with the DMN 
(particularly the PHC), but there were also parts of the network identified outside the DMN 
(in line with recent report101). Thus, the fact that the same neural substrates were active in 
both Experiments 1 and 3 supports, albeit indirectly, the idea that scene construction 
processes may play a role during internal processing in Experiment 1.
Next, using the same independent ROIs defined in Experiment 1, we conducted 
representational similarity analysis between internal processing in Experiment 1 and scene 
construction in Experiment 3. The results are shown in Fig. 4b (for individual data, see 
Supplementary Figure 1b). We found that the only two regions showed strong and highly 
significant positive similarity (after multiple comparison Bonferroni correction for number 
of regions) were the left PHC [t(32)=6.74,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.17, 99.375% CI: 0.14–0.37] 
and right PHC [t(32)=7.09,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.23, 99.375% CI: 0.15–0.36]. In all 
remaining regions, the similarity was negative. This result was close to significance (after 
multiple comparison correction) only in the PCC [t(32)=-2.92,p=0.0062,Cohen's d=0.51, 
99.375% CI: -0.45–0], but not in other regions (p>0.01, Cohen's d<0.47). Examination of a 
direct regional specificity revealed that similarity in the bilateral PHC was significantly 
higher (after multiple comparison correction) than in all other regions 
[t(32)>4.01,p<0.001,Cohen's d>0.89]. Examination of processing type specificity revealed 
high specificity in the bilateral PHC relative to internal processing vs. self-referential 
processing [left PHC: t(31)=5.06,p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.89, 99.375% CI: 0.16–0.51; right 
PHC: t(31)=5.5,p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.97, 99.375% CI: 0.16–0.47]. Relative to internal 
processing vs. sentence-related processing, we found high specificity in the right PHC 
[t(31)=4.16, p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.74, 99.375% CI: 0.07–0.39] and moderate specificity in 
the left PHC [t(31)=2.41, p=0.022,Cohen's d=0.43, 99.375% CI: -0.03–0.3].
In addition, we conducted a searchlight representational analysis between internal 
processing (Experiment 1) and scene construction (Experiment 3). The results are shown in 
Fig. 4c. In line with ROI analysis, the highest similarity was found in the bilateral PHC 
(Supplementary Table 2). In addition, we found relatively high levels of similarity in the 
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retrosplenial cortex and middle occipital gyrus. In line with ROI representational analysis, 
we can see strong negative similarity (light blue color) in the medial frontal and posterior 
cortex, as well as in the left posterior parietal DMN regions (Fig. 4c, top). Taken together 
and in agreement with the literature on scene construction24–27, we conclude that: a) scene 
construction process is likely playing an active role during internal mentation processing; b) 
the PHC, and to a lesser extent parts of the retrosplenial cortex and middle occipital gyrus, 
are the loci of scene construction processing during internal mentation.
As in Experiment 2, we also conducted exploratory representational similarity analysis in 
the PHC between the individual internal tasks of Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 (see 
Supplementary Results, "Representational ROI analysis of individual tasks"). The similarity 
level across individual internal tasks was mostly similar, with a slight trend to lower 
similarity in the "empathizing" task.
Experiment 4 – Language-related processing
Language processing activates a large extent of the lateral parieto-temporal and frontal 
lobes102, 103. The language network partially overlaps with the DMN (i.e., LTC and lateral 
posterior cortex regions), although specifically in the domain of language research, this 
observation has drawn relatively little attention102, 104–106, but see refs107, 108. In 
addition, there is a broad concept of semantic processing, which is explored both as part of 
the language system109 and as an independent domain (e.g., conceptual knowledge110, 
semantic information about a face111, 112). Following the seminal work of Binder and 
colleagues, the role of semantics in DMN processing is widely acknowledged32. While 
early work tended to suggest the involvement of the whole DMN in semantic processing32, 
113, more recent studies have emphasized the role of more specific DMN nodes such as 
LTC and lateral posterior cortex33, 34, 114 and to a lesser extent the PCC115. We used our 
general approach described above to identify language-related processing during internal 
processing (i.e., the internal tasks of Experiment 1). The same participants of Experiments 
1–3 took part in Experiment 4, which used a well-established paradigm to identify language-
related processing103. Participants were visually presented meaningful sentences and series 
of meaningless non-words, while the words or non-words were presented one item at a time 
(see Methods for full details).
First, we conducted a GLM second-level, random-effects analysis contrasting meaningful 
sentences and meaningless non-words conditions (Fig. 5a). We observed a well-known 
network of regions related to language processing103. We can also clearly see that the 
bilateral LTC and to smaller extent lateral posterior cortex regions overlap with the DMN. 
Next, using independent ROIs from Experiment 1, we conducted representational similarity 
analysis between internal processing in Experiment 1 (four internal tasks > baseline) and 
language-related processing in Experiment 4 (meaningful sentences > meaningless non-
words). This analysis revealed (Fig. 5b and Supplementary Figure 1c, for individual data) 
strongest and highly significant similarity (after multiple comparison Bonferroni correction) 
in the bilateral LTC [left LTC: t(33)=8.22,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.41, 99.375% CI: 0.25–0.53; 
right LTC: t(33)=9.9,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.7, 99.375% CI: 0.29–0.53]. In addition, a much 
weaker, but still significant (after multiple comparison Bonferroni correction), the similarity 
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was found in the right angular gyrus (t(33)=3.04,p=0.005, Cohen's d=0.52, 99.375% CI: 
0.01–0.39). In the remaining regions the similarity values were not significant: left PHC 
[t(33)=2.58,p=0.014,Cohen's d=0.44, 99.375% CI: -0.01–0.23], left angular gyrus 
[t(33)=2.33,p=0.026, Cohen's d=0.4, 99.375% CI: -0.05–0.41], PCC, mPFC, and right PHC 
[t(33)<1]. Examination of direct regional specificity revealed that similarity in the bilateral 
LTC was significantly higher (after multiple comparison correction) than in the PCC, mPFC 
and bilateral PHC [t(33)>5.4, p<0.001,Cohen's d>0.93]. The right LTC had significantly 
higher similarity (after multiple comparison correction), compared to the bilateral angular 
gyrus [t(33)>3.15, p<0.003,Cohen's d>0.54]. The left LTC had significantly higher 
similarity (after multiple comparison correction), compared to the left angular gyrus 
[t(33)=3.15,p=0.003,Cohen's d=0.54, 99.28% CI: 0.02–0.4], but compared to the right 
angular gyrus the results did not reach significance after multiple comparison 
[t(33)=2.68,p=0.01,Cohen's d=0.46, 99.28% CI: -0.01–0.4]. Similarity in the right angular 
gyrus was significantly higher (after multiple comparison correction), only compared to the 
mPFC [t(33)=4.05,p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.69, 99.28% CI: 0.1–0.56]. Examination of 
processing type specificity revealed that the bilateral LTC was highly specific relative to 
both internal processing vs. self-referential processing [left LTC: 
t(31)=4.55,p<0.001,Cohen's d=0.8, 99.375% CI: 0.09–0.43; right LTC: 
t(31)=6.47,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.14, 99.375% CI: 0.22–0.57] and internal processing vs. 
scene construction [left LTC: t(31)=7,p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.23, 99.375% CI: 0.24–0.58; 
right LTC: t(31)=8.15, p<0.001,Cohen's d=1.44, 99.375% CI: 0.31–0.66].
In addition, we conducted a searchlight representational analysis between internal 
processing (Experiment 1) and scene construction (Experiment 4). The unthresholded 
findings and significant clusters are shown in Fig. 5c (top) and Fig. 5c (bottom; primary 
voxel-wised threshold p<0.001, p<0.05, cluster size corrected), respectively. In agreement 
with ROI analysis, the highest similarity has been found in the bilateral LTC. The similarity 
was found to a much lesser extent in the lateral posterior parietal regions, while only the 
cluster in the right hemisphere reached significance. An additional small cluster has been 
also found in the right superior frontal gyrus (see, Supplementary Table 2). In total, we 
conclude that a) language-related processing plays a role during internal mentation 
processing; b) the bilateral LTC, and to a much lesser extent the lateral posterior parietal 
region, are the loci of language-related processing during internal mentation
We also conducted an exploratory representational similarity analysis between individual 
internal tasks of Experiment 1 and Experiment 4. We found that similarity during episodic 
memory task was lower, particularly in the left LTC, compared to other tasks (see 
Supplementary Results, "Representational ROI analysis of individual tasks").
To summarize the key results, significant clusters from the searchlight representational 
similarity analyses were converted into binary maps. The neural substrates of three cognitive 
processes identified are shown in Fig. 6.
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Discussion
In the present study, using four fMRI experiments with the same participants we delineated 
the neural substrates of three cognitive processes and showed that these neural substrates 
were active concurrently during self-generated cognition. These findings support the idea 
that our internal mental experience is the result of a combination of activities from different 
cognitive (and neural) processes.
The DMN is one of the most explored networks of the human brain14. This network 
specializes in the amodal, non-sensory, internally directed cognition and is located at the 
apex of the processing hierarchy40, 116–118. According to an influential multi-component 
account4, internal experience is a combination of activity of different cognitive processes 
operating within the DMN. Through a series of analyses, we identified the neural substrates 
of three cognitive processes: self-referential processing, mental scene construction, and 
language-related processing (Fig. 6). Our study was designed a priori to focus on these 
cognitive processes, so our results do not imply that these three processes were the only 
active processes during internal processing tasks. In order to specifically delineate cognitive 
processes during self-generated processing, we used an experimental approach that included 
separate experiments to elucidate a specific type of processing (i.e., Experiments 2–4) 
followed by representational similarity analysis between experiments (see further discussion 
below). We showed that different cognitive processes all functioned at the same time during 
self-generated processing (i.e., internal tasks of Experiment 1). Put simply, the participants 
were lying in a scanner with their eyes closed, performing the internal tasks of Experiment 
1. With the help of Experiments 2-4 and especially the use of representational similarity 
analysis, we established that the mental experience of the participants was a mixture of self-
referential, mental scene construction, and language-related cognitive processes. We 
observed that: a) different cognitive processes have specific neural representations, both at 
the level of regional specificity and at the level of processing type specificity; and b) the 
activity level of the cognitive system could differ across tasks, possibly reflecting the extent 
to which the process is needed for execution of a specific task (e.g., higher activity of self-
referential system while recalling a personal event compared to imagining non-personal 
situation, Supplementary Figure 2a). Our neuroimaging results were paralleled by 
introspective behavioral reports, showing that participants had vivid scenes in their minds 
while performing the tasks of Experiment 1, but not during the self-referential processing of 
Experiment 2. All this suggests that different processes are likely responsible for different 
aspects of internal processing. Taken together, our results support the idea that our mental 
experience is mediated by different cognitive processes.
Self-generated cognition in the DMN has been explored extensively, especially over the last 
decade. Task-based self-generated studies have revealed that while the DMN is involved in 
processing various self-generated tasks15, 90, 119, the network is also heterogeneous in 
such a way that different parts of the DMN are selective to specific tasks and types of 
processing7, 8, 18, 65–69, 120, 121. For example, both autobiographical memory and theory 
of mind tasks activate the frontal and temporal-parietal regions, but the autobiographical 
memory task activates the midline regions more strongly7. The observation that different 
parts of the DMN are selective to specific tasks supports the multi-component account, but 
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this support is only indirect. First, contrasting between cognitively complex internal tasks 
(e.g., recalling personal episode vs. empathize with someone), as was done in many previous 
studies, is unlikely to delineate cognitive processes in a specific way because such tasks are 
different in many aspects. Second, and even more critical, none of the previous studies 
(except for one, see below) demonstrated several cognitive processes working at the same 
time. In fact, it does not seem even theoretically possible to show several processes working 
at the same time when a contrast between two tasks is the analysis method. Another corpus 
of studies explored spontaneous (i.e., non-task initiated) self-generated cognition in the 
DMN by correlating across participants functional35, 74–81 (or anatomical74) connectivity 
during resting scan with behavioral measures obtained outside the scanner. The researchers 
found, for example, that specific connectivity patterns in the DMN were associated with 
behavioral mind-wandering scores79, that patterns of hippocampus connectivity were 
associated with individual autobiographical goals80, and that connectivity between PCC and 
the temporal lobe was associated with different features of experience such as episodic 
memory and emotions75. Overall, the aforementioned resting-state studies revealed the 
component processes and components of thought, thus supporting the multi-component 
account. However, given that the functional connectivity measures are based on several 
minutes of resting scans, and the fact that correlation analyses are conducted across 
participants, the results of these studies do not directly support the thesis that the specific 
cognitive experience of an individual person is achieved by several cognitive processes 
working at the same time. It is noteworthy that some of the previous studies identified 
components of thought (or types of thought), but not cognitive processes75–78. But it is not 
evident how components of thought such as "thinking about the future" or "being on task" 
are mapped onto cognitive processes. Overall, while many studies have supported the multi-
component account, more direct support is still needed.
To date, the study by Andrews-Hanna and colleagues82 has been the only study that 
provided direct support to the multi-component account, by showing that different cognitive 
processes work concurrently. A follow-up study of Andrews-Hanna and colleagues70 also 
demonstrated different cognitive processes, but without showing them working together. 
Compared to the first study of Andrews-Hanna and colleagues82, here we report one largely 
similar cognitive process (i.e., self-related processing), another more specific and restricted 
cognitive process (i.e., current "mental scene construction" vs. previously reported "mental 
scene construction and episodic memory"), and also an additional cognitive process 
(language-related processing; see more detailed discussion below). We also extend previous 
findings by showing that cognitive processes might have variable levels of activity across 
different tasks (Supplementary Figure 2). Finally, to identify cognitive processes in the 
brain, our method does not rely on introspective reports. That is, whereas introspective 
experience sampling is a valuable tool5, 11, 75, 76, 82, its general limitation is that 
participants can report only on matters of which they were aware. For example, in our case, 
it would have been very difficult – if not impossible – to obtain a reliable report of the extent 
to which participants used language-related or semantic systems during recall of a past 
episode from memory. Using our method, it was possible to identify cognitive systems that 
operate largely unconsciously.
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The cognitive systems we identified were mostly confined to the DMN (Fig. 6), 
corroborating the principal role of the DMN in self-generated cognition. More specifically, 
self-referential processing was found in the PCC and medial PFC, which is in agreement 
with the large self-referential literature17, 18, 20, 21, 23 and self-related component reported 
earlier82. In addition, again in line with the literature94, the self-referential processing 
system included the lateral parietal cortex region (mostly angular gyrus) with a strong left 
lateralization (Figs. 3 and 6). The effect of laterality that we found underscores that when the 
analysis of the DMN is conducted for only one hemisphere [e.g. ref 82], caution is needed 
when these results are generalized to another hemisphere. The mental scene-construction 
cognitive system that we identified exhibited a large locus in the PHC and weaker activity in 
the retrosplenial and middle occipital cortex (Figs. 4 and 6). These results are in agreement 
with previous reports, implicating these regions in scene imagery28 and mental scene 
construction24–27. Some of the brain regions associated with mental scene construction 
were not only inside, but also outside the DMN (Fig. 6). This observation is reminiscent of a 
recent proposal101, according to which the scene processing system consists of two 
networks: the first being perceptual-visual (i.e., outside DMN) and the second one being 
non-perceptual, which is related to various types of internal processing (i.e., within DMN). 
A final note relates to the methodology that we used. The use of perceptual task (i.e., visual 
scenes) as a biomarker to identify mental scene construction was based on a wealth of 
evidence that there is neural similarity between visual imagery and perception122–124. 
However, despite this similarity, perception and imagery are still different phenomena. In 
particular, the fact that the extent of our scene construction component was relatively limited 
in the DMN could potentially result from using a perceptual task as a biomarker. In the 
future, it will be of interest to validate our results using a non-perceptual task as a biomarker 
to identify mental scene construction process.
We also successfully delineated language-related processing within the DMN, demonstrating 
that language-related processing plays a prominent role during internally directed cognition. 
The loci of language-related activity were very specific: the strongest in the lateral temporal 
cortex and to a much lesser extent in the lateral posterior parietal cortex (Figs. 5 and 6). 
These results agree with previous results regarding the role of these regions in semantic 
processing32–34. Notably, our evidence was based on representation analysis, which is a 
much stronger measure for establishing processing similarities compared to the conjunction 
analysis (i.e., spatial overlap of activations) used previously32, 34. We found some level of 
right lateralization in the lateral posterior parietal cortex (Fig. 5c), though it did not reach 
significance in a direct test. Interestingly, a very significant opposite (i.e., left) lateralization 
effect was found for self-referential processing (Fig. 3c). Thus, we may observe hemispheric 
functional specialization at the level of different cognitive processes. It is worth noting that 
our study did not attempt to elucidate specific types of language-related processing (e.g., 
syntax, inner speech, semantics). In the future, by capitalizing on our approach and 
methodology, it may be possible to subdivide language-related processing into smaller 
processes.
An essential aspect of the present work is that we have identified the specific neural 
substrates of cognitive processes. Delineating specific processes during self-generated 
processing has traditionally been challenging due to the processes being inherently 
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intertwined. For example, functional profiles of episodic memory retrieval and self-
referential processing18, 85, episodic and semantic memory86, 87, as well as episodic 
memory and mental scene construction27, 83 are not easily dissociated. To some extent, 
inaccurate delineation of neural loci of cognitive processes could have potentially 
contributed to the proposals that there is only one key cognitive process within the DMN19, 
26, 32, 125. That is, these studies could have attributed a mixture of cognitive processes to a 
single process. Herein, we ensured specific delineation by selectivity manipulating a specific 
type of processing in Experiments 2–4. The neural signature obtained in these experiments 
was compared to the self-generated internal processing observed in Experiment 1. Critically, 
we found a neural similarity between Experiment 1 and Experiments 2–4, despite the use of 
completely different designs, stimuli, and tasks, therefore suggesting that we are dealing 
with a genuine phenomenon. Furthermore, we used representational similarity analysis95 – 
an approach that helps establish similarity in information processing96. Remarkably, the 
high similarity we found was in very specific regions and observed through comparison of 
very specific experiments. This latter observation speaks against the possibility that the 
correlation reflects some unspecific, cognitively unrelated phenomenon (e.g., vascular 
response). Overall, our experimental approach permitted to achieve a specific and accurate 
delineation of cognitive processes. We suggest that our approach can be used in the future to 
explore additional cognitive systems. In particular, DMN processing in general and 
specifically the internal tasks used here are to a large extent social in nature19, 42, 70, 126. 
Using our design, we could not estimate and evaluate what role social processing played in 
the execution of the self-generated tasks of Experiment 1. In the future, using the approach 
proposed here, it should be possible to identify cognitive processes related to social 
cognition and theory of mind.
In conclusion, the key finding of the present work was that several distinct cognitive 
processes are active concurrently during internal processing. This result supports the idea 
that human cognitive experiences may be achieved by pooling over multiple cognitive 
processes at any given time.
Methods
Apparatus
MRI data were collected using a 3T GE MRI scanner. The key functional MRI EPI 
parameters were: TR: 2.5 sec; TE: 30 ms; slice thickness: 3.6 mm; in-plane acquisition 
resolution: 2.08x2.08 mm. For more details, see Supplementary Methods.
Participants
Forty-one healthy volunteers: average age: 28 (standard deviation: 5.07), 17 females, two 
left-handed. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Tel Aviv Sourasky 
Medical Center. Informed written consent was provided by all participants before starting 
the experiment. Data of five participants were excluded from the analysis due to excessive 
movements in the scanner (>1 cm). The number of participants reported below is after 
exclusion of these five participants. The number of participants in each experiment was as 
follows: Experiment 1: thirty-six, Experiment 2: thirty-four, Experiment 3: thirty-three, 
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Experiment 4: thirty-four. Thirty-one participants took part in all experiments. Our sample 
size was above the current median number of participants in fMRI studies127 and 
approximately double the number of participants in key studies in this field5, 25, 65, 69, 93. 
In addition to the listed experiments, the study included resting state session (duration: 6 
minutes and 10 seconds). The resting state session was not analyzed in the present paper.
Experimental Setup
Experiment 1 – Self-generated cognition—Images of real-life situations were used in 
the experiment. Participants performed five tasks, defined by an image cue and task 
instruction (Fig. 1a). Four internal mentation tasks were as follows: (1) "past imagery": 
imagining the situation that had happened before the depicted scene; (2) "future imagery": 
imagining the situation that might happen after the depicted scene; (3) "episodic memory": 
recalling a personal episodic memory event related to the depicted scene; (4) "empathizing": 
imagining yourself in the place of the person in the image. Baseline condition ("rhyme 
generation") required generation of the words that rhyme with a given word (unrelated to a 
stimulus image). The structure of the trials is presented in Fig. 1a and it was identical for all 
conditions. All the tasks were executed silently ("in the mind"), without speech. For more 
details, see Supplementary Methods.
Experiment 2 – Self-referential processing—The material included 54 single Hebrew 
verbs words (infinitive verbs), which can characterize a person (e.g., to volunteer, to smile, 
to lie, to smoke). The design of these experiments was similar to previous experiments with 
self-referential tasks92–94. The two key conditions of our experiment were: 1) "self-
processing" condition: to decide whether the action described by a verb was characteristic or 
not of a participant; 2)"non-self-processing" condition: to decide whether an action was 
characteristic of some ideal person. For more details see the Supplementary Methods.
Experiment 3 – Visual scenes and objects—We used a standard visual functional 
localizer of scene-selective regions99, which included images of unfamiliar natural scenes 
(e.g., mountains, lakes) and everyday objects (e.g., a ball, a chair). The behavioral task was 
"1-back" (i.e., to detect the same image that appeared twice in a row). The design was very 
similar to the one used in our previous study128. For more details see the Supplementary 
Methods.
Experiment 4 – Language-related processing—The paradigm we used has been 
shown to reliably localize the language-processing network103. The design described below 
is almost identical to the one used in our previous studies129, 130. The words (non-words) 
were presented sequentially at fixation. There were two conditions: the written meaningful 
sentences (comprised of words), and the series of meaningless non-words. Non-words were 
created as random permutation of the letters, so most of the non-words were 
unpronounceable and could not be read. The number of letters in the words and non-words 
was the same. For more details, see Supplementary Methods.
Behavioral assessment outside the scanner—After completing all fMRI 
experiments, participants rated their subjective experiences during scanning [Likert scale: 1 
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(low level)–10 (high level)]. For establishing the extent participants were engaged in self-
referential processing during the tasks of Experiment 2, we asked them "To what extent each 
one of the tasks was associated with self-related and personal thoughts?". To evaluate mental 
scene imagery during the execution of tasks in Experiments 1 and 2, the participants were 
asked: "To what extent each one of the tasks was associated with having a mental scene in 
your mind?" Due to technical problems, behavioral reports for three participants are missing.
Data Analysis
Preprocessing—SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) was used for data analysis. The preprocessing steps included 
realignment, slice-time correction, motion correction, normalization (2x2x3 mm voxel size) 
and spatial smoothing (FWHM = 6 mm kernel). A unified segmentation procedure131 was 
used for normalization. Representational similarity analysis was conducted using non-
smoothed data.
Experiment 1 – Self-generated cognition—The data from the experiment were split 
into two parts: the first session and the remaining sessions. The first session was used for 
defining Regions of Interest (see below) and for illustration of the DMN as a blue contour 
(Figs. 3–6). The remaining sessions were used for all the main analyses. This procedure 
ensured independent ROI localization91.
The first-level fixed effects GLM model (boxcar function) was estimated using five 
regressors of interest: "future imagery", "past imagery", "episodic memory", "empathizing", 
and "rhyme generation". Six motion parameters from preprocessing step were included as 
the covariate of no interest. The task analysis period was 15 sec (task instruction: 4 s and the 
period after instruction: 11 s). Control analysis for only the period after instruction (11 s) 
yielded qualitatively similar results. For each internal task, we defined first-level contrast as 
internal task larger than "rhyme generation" (4 separate contrasts). Four second-level 
random effects group models were estimated using first-level contrasts. The resulting 
activation maps were thresholded with a voxel-wise primary threshold p-value<0.001 and 
cluster-level threshold p-value < 0.05, corrected. The primary threshold p-value<0.001 has 
been previously shown to control well for the false positive rate88, 89. The cluster-level 
thresholding was done using Monte-Carlo simulation using the AlphaSim function in a 
REST toolbox132. This thresholding approach is widely used in the fMRI literature (e.g. 
refs133–135). Percent signal change time-courses (Fig. 2) were extracted using the MarsBar 
region of interest toolbox for SPM136.
ROIs were defined individually for each participant as the cluster with the highest DMN 
selectivity in the first session. ROIs were created automatically (MATLAB custom code137) 
based on the individual DMN peak activations constrained by the parcellation atlas of 
Craddock and colleagues138. For full details see Supplementary Methods, ROI definition. 
ROI volume was 2160 mm3, approximately equivalent to a sphere with radius 8 mm. 
Average location of the ROIs is shown in Fig. 1c and Supplementary Table 1.
Representational similarity analyses (RSA)95, 139 were performed using spatially non-
smoothed data. We explain the similarity analysis between Experiment 1 (internal 
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processing) and Experiment 2 (self-referential processing). Other similarity analyses were 
conducted using the same logic. In the ROI RSA, for each participant/ROI, the first-level 
analysis contrast values (i.e., SPM "con" images) of Experiment 1 (four internal tasks > 
rhymes generation contrast) and Experiment 3 ("self-referential" vs. "non-self-referential") 
were extracted. Thus, for each region, we obtained two vectors of data (i.e., one vector per 
contrast). We calculated the Spearman rank correlation between these vectors. Similar 
results were obtained using Pearson and Kendall tau. Correlation values were subsequently 
transformed using Fischer r-to-z transform. For each region, transformed correlation values 
across participants were submitted to one-sample, two-sided t-test vs. 0. Prior to this, 
normality assumptions were validated using the Lilliefors test. Similarity values significantly 
above zero indicate that there was some degree of similarity between the two types of 
processing. Bonferroni multiple comparison correction for number of regions was used 
(number of regions=8, alpha=0.05/8=0.00625). To establish regional specificity, we 
compared similarity values with values of other ROIs. Bonferroni multiple comparison 
correction for the number of comparison of each ROI was used (number of comparisons=7, 
alpha=0.05/7=0.0071). We also conducted processing type specificity analysis (see the 
corresponding section in the Supplementary Methods). In the whole-brain searchlight 
RSA139, 140, we used a sphere with a radius 4 mm (268 mm3). Results with a larger sphere 
(radius: 8 mm, volume: 2145 mm3) were generally similar, but a smaller sphere improved 
spatial specificity. Iteratively, the sphere was moved with a step of one voxel over the whole 
brain, so that each time a different voxel was used as a centre of a sphere112. At the end of 
the process, the similarity values for each voxel were averaged141. Significance was 
established at group level (i.e., across subjects) using one-sample, two-sided t-test vs. 0. The 
resulting activation maps were thresholded using exactly the same procedure used in the 
GLM analysis: voxel-wise primary threshold p-value < 0.001 and cluster-level threshold p-
value < 0.05, corrected (cluster size was established using Monte-Carlo simulation132). In 
addition, the unthresholded statistical maps were also shown (Figs. 3c, 4c and 5c).
Experiment 2 – Self-referential processing—The first-level GLM model (boxcar 
function) was estimated for each participant using three regressors of interest (i.e., self-
processing, non-self-processing and letters comparison) and six motion parameters as 
regressors of no interest. To assess self-referential selectivity, the SPM contrast "self-
processing" greater than "non-self-processing" was used.
Experiment 3 – Visual scenes and objects—The first-level GLM model (boxcar 
function) was estimated for each participant using two regressors of interest (scenes and 
objects conditions) and six motion parameters as regressors of no interest.
Experiment 4 – Language-related processing—The first-level GLM model (boxcar 
function) was estimated for each participant using two regressors of interest (meaningful 
sentences and non-words) and six motion parameters as regressors of no interest.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. 
Experiment 1: Schematic flow of the experimental trial, results of the group-level analysis of 
four internal tasks and location of Regions of interest (ROIs). (a) Schematic flow of the trial 
(from left to right). After seeing a picture, the participants received the task instruction, and 
started to execute the task with their eyes closed. The task execution ended with a beep 
sound, followed by vividness rating of the experience. There were five tasks (conditions): 
imagine what happened before ("past imagery") or after ("future imagery") the depicted 
scene, recall a personal episodic memory related to the depicted scene ("episodic memory"), 
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imagine yourself in the place of the person in the image ("empathizing"), and generate 
words that rhyme with a provided word (baseline condition; the target word was provided at 
the stage of task instruction). Each of the pictures was repeated once for each of the five 
experimental conditions. Notably, the image was presented in all conditions including 
baseline, to preserve identical visual stimulation. Accordingly, the contrast between internal 
task and baseline does not include the activity elicited by visual scene. (b) Results of the 
group-level random effect analysis of Experiment 1 (n=36): Four tasks of interest (episodic 
memory, future imagery, past imagery, and empathizing) contrasted separately against the 
rhyme-generation baseline task (voxel-wise primary threshold p-value < 0.001 and a cluster-
level threshold p-value < 0.05, corrected. Note the typical DMN activations for all four 
conditions. Statistical maps were overlaid on T1 SPM template brain. (c) Average location 
of the ROIs. The ROIs used in the analysis were defined as individual clusters and were not 
spherical (see Methods). Locations here represent average location across participants (see 
also Supplementary Table 1). Abbreviations: mPFC is medial prefrontal cortex, PCC is 
posterior cingulate cortex, AG is angular gyrus, LTC is lateral temporal cortex, and PHC is 
parahippocampal cortex.
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Figure 2. 
Experiment 1 (n=36): Percent signal change time-courses for five experimental conditions 
("future imagery," "past imagery," "episodic memory," "empathizing," and "rhyme 
generation") in the DMN. The units of the X axis are TRs (2.5 sec). The first bin of the X 
axis corresponds to the onset of task instruction (see Fig. 1a). Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. Note: a) large differences between four internal tasks and rhymes 
generation baseline condition; b) differences in shape of time-courses across internal tasks: a 
clear positive and inverted U-shape response in the PCC, angular gyrus, and mPFC in 
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"episodic memory" condition, and a clear negative and U-shape response in the PHC; c) a 
higher response to "episodic memory" compared to other conditions in the mPFC and PCC.
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Figure 3. 
Experiment 2 (n=34): Self-referential processing. (a) Group-level random effect analysis of 
self-referential processing of Experiment 2 (contrast: "self-referential" > "non-self-
referential"). Statistical threshold: primary voxel-wised threshold p < 0.001, p<0.05, cluster 
size corrected. The blue contour line denotes the DMN identified using the first 
(independent) session of the experiment ("four internal conditions > baseline"). Note, that 
significant clusters within the DMN were found in the mPFC, PCC, and left angular gyrus, 
but not in the PHC, LTC, and right angular gyrus. (b) ROI representational similarity 
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analysis between internal processing (Experiment 1, four internal tasks combined) and self-
referential processing (Experiment 2). The values reflect the average across participants 
within-ROI Spearman correlation between the internal processing contrast of Experiment 1 
(four internal tasks > baseline) and the self-referential processing contrast of Experiment 2 
("self-referential" > "non-self-referential"). Similarity values denote Fischer z-transformed 
correlation results. Note, high similarity values in the mPFC, PCC, and to a lesser extent in 
the left angular gyrus. Significance above zero was established using one sample, two-tail t-
test (multiple comparison Bonferroni correction for number of tested regions, N=8, 
alpha=0.05/8=0.00625). For regional specificity and task specificity analyses, see the 
Results section. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. For individual data, see 
Supplementary Figure 1a. (c) Searchlight ROI representational similarity analysis between 
internal processing (Experiment 1, four internal tasks combined) and self-referential 
processing (Experiment 2). Top: unthresholded statistical results map; Bottom: thresholded 
significant clusters (primary voxel-wised threshold p < 0.001, p<0.05, cluster size 
corrected). Note the high similarity in the mPFC, PCC, and left posterior parietal cortex, but 
not in other regions of the cortex. Also note the strong left lateralization in the posterior 
parietal cortex.
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Figure 4. 
Experiment 3 (n=33): Scene construction. (a) Group-level random effect analysis, "scenes" > 
"objects" contrast. Statistical threshold: primary voxel-wised threshold p < 0.001, p<0.05, 
cluster size corrected. Note, that the largest and most significant clusters within the DMN 
were found in the PHC. (b) ROI representational similarity analysis between internal 
processing (Experiment 1, four internal tasks combined) and "scenes" > "objects" contrast 
(Experiment 3). Note, much higher than zero similarity values in the bilateral PHC. 
Significance above zero was established using one sample, two-tail t-test (multiple 
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comparison Bonferroni correction for number of tested regions, N=8, 
alpha=0.05/8=0.00625). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. For individual data, 
see Supplementary Figure 1b. (c) Searchlight ROI representational similarity analysis 
between internal processing (Experiment 1, four internal tasks combined) and "scenes" > 
"objects" contrast (Experiment 3). Top: unthresholded statistical results map; Bottom: 
thresholded significant clusters (primary voxel-wised threshold p < 0.001, p<0.05, cluster 
size corrected). Note the high similarity in the PHC, and to a lesser extent in the 
retrosplenial cortex and middle occipital gyrus, but not in other regions of the cortex.
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Figure 5. 
Experiment 4 (n=34): Language-related processing. (a) Group-level random effect analysis 
of language-related processing of Experiment 4 (contrast: meaningful sentences > 
meaningless non-words). Statistical threshold: primary voxel-wised threshold p < 0.001, 
p<0.05, cluster size corrected. Note, that the largest and most significant clusters within the 
DMN were found in the LTC. (b) ROI representational similarity analysis between internal 
processing (Experiment 1, four internal tasks combined) and language-related processing 
(meaningful sentences > meaningless non-words, Experiment 4). Note, highest similarity 
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values in the bilateral LTC. Significance above zero was established using one sample, two-
tail t-test (multiple comparison Bonferroni correction for number of tested regions, N=8, 
alpha=0.05/8=0.00625). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. For individual data, 
see Supplementary Figure 1c. (c) Searchlight ROI representational similarity analysis 
between internal processing (Experiment 1, four internal tasks combined) and language-
related processing (meaningful sentences > meaningless non-words, Experiment 4). Top: 
unthresholded statistical results map; Bottom: thresholded significant clusters (primary 
voxel-wised threshold p < 0.001, p<0.05, cluster size corrected). Note the highest similarity 
in the bilateral LTC.
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Figure 6. 
Summary results: neural loci of three cognitive processes. Results reflect thresholded and 
binarized maps of corresponding searchlight representational analyses (Figs. 3c, 4c and 5c). 
The three cognitive processes are self-referential processing (yellow color), mental scene 
construction (magenta color), and language-related processing (green color). Note that 
cognitive systems had specific loci (i.e., no spatial overlap between cognitive systems).
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